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NOTES AND COMMENTS




Telecommunications is probably the most international of industries.'
An international telecommunications system provides the vehicle for in-
creased international global communication, understanding, and coop-
eration.2 Telecommunications now plays such an integral role in rela-
tionships among nations that alterations in the telecommunications
structure result in world-wide economic changes.3 Modern telecommu-
nication systems provide for the order, shipment, and delivery of goods
in international trade; facilitate the international financial flows neces-
sary for investment and management of foreign assets; and allow the
efficient production of goods manufactured and assembled in more than
one country.4 The United States depends heavily on a working interna-
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Opening Address by The Right Honorable Jeffrey E. Pattie, British Minister
for Industry and Information Technology, to USERCOM 9 (Mar. 25, 1987) [herein-
after Pattie Address] (stating that telecommunications is probably the most interna-
tional of industries).
2. See Hearings before Subcommittees on International Operations & Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985) (statement of Walter Hinchman, Pres. Walter Hinchman and
Assoc., Inc.). [hereinafter Hinchman before Int'l Operations Subcomm.] (defining in-
ternational telecommunications as an electronic transmission along an established link
between points in two or more countries); see also Jequier, Telecommunications for
Development: Findings of the ITU-OECD Project, 8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'v" 83,
83 (1984) (remarking that the telecommunications industry makes annual worldwide
investments of $60 billion); Caplan, The Case For and Against Private International
Communications Satellite Systems, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 180, 183 (1986) (noting that
international telecommunication is one of the fastest growing sectors of the telecommu-
nications industry).
3. Hinchman before Int'l Operations Subcomm., supra note 2, at 3.
4. SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND IN-
FORMATION POLICY, A WHITE PAPER ON NEW INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS 9
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tional telecommunications system for the development of its service in-
dustry, national defense, and foreign policy.
International telecommunications requires cooperation among indi-
vidual domestic telecommunications organizations as well as coordina-
tion of the international system with the various legal, economic, social,
and political backgrounds and the different level of technical sophisti-
cation of each participant.5 In 1962, a multilateral declaration, the
Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Communi-
cations Satellite System," articulated the goal of providing the most ad-
vanced international telecommunications technology available to all ar-
eas of the world for the benefit of all nations. The membership of 112
nations 8 in the resulting International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT)9 demonstrates the importance of a working
telecommunications system to the international community despite the
barriers these countries must overcome.
From the launch of the first Early Bird satellite in 196510 through
(1985) (available at FCC Docket No. 84-1299) [hereinafter SENIOR INTERAOENCY
GROUP].
5. Sarreals, International Telecommunications Satellite Services: The Spirit of
Cooperation Versus the Battle for Competition, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 267, 301 (1986).
Sarreals also notes in contrast that a single legal, economic, and political system gov-
erns domestic telecommunications. Id.
6. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Communications
Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, at preamble, 15 U.S.T. 1705, 1705-06, T.I.A.S. No.
5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 26-28 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing Interim Arrange-
ments]. This Agreement, signed by representatives from eleven nations, formed IN-
TELSAT. Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation of the Rea-
gan Administration Policy on International Satellite Telecommunications, 13 J.
SPACE L. 103, 107 (1985).
7. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements, supra note 6, at preamble.
8. Casatelli, INTELSAT'S Richard Colino Candid on Competition, 3 NETWORK
WORLD I (Oct. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Casatelli]. Member nations are economically and
politically varied and diverse and include the People's Republic of China, Ghana, the
United States, Western Europe and some South Pacific island countries. Sarrcals,
supra note 5, at 301.
9. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation, with annexes, Aug. 20, 1971, art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3823, T.I.A.S. No.
7532 [hereinafter- INTELSAT Agreement]. INTELSAT is a multinational commercial
cooperative which owns and operates a global communications satellite system. Pre-
pared Remarks by Richard R. Colino, Director General of INTELSAT Before the
Federal Communications Bar Association 1 (Apr. 23, 1986) (available at INTELSAT)
[hereinafter Colino Before Federal Communications Bar]. Next to the United States
government, INTELSAT is the largest consumer of United States communications sat-
ellite technology. Comments of Abbott Washburn, at 7, In the matter of Establishment
of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-
1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments of Abbott Washburn]. INTELSAT has
awarded $4.2 billion toward equipment expenditures to the United States telecommuni-
cations industry as of 1985. Id.
10. Colino, The Art of Global Salesmanship, 62 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICA-
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the mid-1980s, INTELSAT has been largely successful in providing a
worldwide international telecommunications satellite system. Recent
technological revolutions however, have widened economic disparities
among the countries served. These developments, by creating new de-
mands in the telecommunications markets of the most advanced na-
tions, place new pressures on the international telecommunications
system.
Under article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement, the service
charges for utilization of the INTELSAT system are averaged among
all users of each service without regard to geographic location, traffic
volume, economic status, or the state's efficient use of the system. Thus,
the cost of providing telecommunications services to less efficient users
burdens the more efficient users. This practice frustrates the goal of
INTELSAT, namely meeting the newest market demands by forcing
customers of the most advanced technology to pay inflated prices.
The pricing inflexibilities of INTELSAT create strong incentives for
private competition in the international satellite telecommunications
market. Consequently, the largest and most advanced customer of IN-
TELSAT, the United States, has authorized the establishment of sepa-
rate competitor systems. The United States asserts that the separate
competitor system is consistent with its national interest.
The separate systems, if implemented, will cause great economic
harm to INTELSAT and many of its members. The purpose of this
Comment is to advocate the amendment of article V(d) of the INTEL-
SAT Agreement to create additional price flexibility and allow it to
more efficiently meet the demands of a diversifying telecommunications
market without harming the availability of global telecommunications
service to the underdeveloped regions of the world.
Part I of this Comment discusses the creation of INTELSAT, the
subsequent growth of the international telecommunications market,
and the resulting disparity between markets of the developed and un-
derdeveloped countries. Part II outlines the practice of telecommunica-
tions price subsidization for less developed countries (LDCs) under ar-
ticle V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement and analyzes the effects of
this practice on the overall telecommunications market. Part III exam-
ines the introduction of separate competitor systems and the responsive
marketing attempts of INTELSAT to meet the challenge. Part IV dis-
cusses the degree of price flexibility for services allowed under article
V(d). Part V proposes an amendment to article V(d) that would pro-
TIONS COUNCIL 31 (Oct. 1986) [hereinafter Global Salesmanship]. Richard Colino is
the Director General and Chief Executive of INTELSAT. Id.
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vide for greater pricing flexibility under INTELSAT and, at the same
time, limit pricing flexibility in a manner consistent with the ultimate
preservation of the system. Part VI argues that greater pricing flexibil-
ity will ultimately prevent harm to INTELSAT's investor owners while
maintaining pace with the revolutionizing markets of the developed
world. Part VII proposes that a compromise between complete flexibil-
ity and continued subsidization will prevent harm to LDCs, thereby
preventing the withdrawal of these countries from the INTELSAT sys-
tem. This Comment concludes that a pricing flexibility modification to
art. V(d) will best serve all aspects of the international telecommunica-
tions satellite market.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
International telecommunications has developed in a "leapfrog pat-
tern" since the first major breakthrough in the mid-1950s, when newly
developed submarine cables began to replace high frequency radio as
the provider of communications services." This new system captured
most of the international communications market in telephone and tele-
graph/data services. 12 The laying of transatlantic cables for these ser-
vices was maintained until the mid-1960s.
13
The Cold War, the space race, and the desire of the United States to
formulate an international mechanism through which it could project
its leadership into the communications satellite competition stimulated
the creation of INTELSAT. 4 The Kennedy administration called for
the establishment of a global communications satellite network as an
attempt to compete with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the de-
veloping nations.' 5 As a consequence, on August 20, 1964, the United
11. Id.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 271 n.16.
14. Id.
15. Reply Comments of International Relay, Inc. at 7 n.9, In the Matter of Estab-
lishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket
No. 84-1299 (June 5, 1985). On July 21, 1961, the Kennedy administration invited "all
nations to participate in a communication satellite system in the interest of world peace
and closer brotherhood among peoples throughout the world." Id. at 14. The policy
statement favored a global system which included service where certain portions of the
coverage were unprofitable. Id. This was termed a 'universalist' system. Id. at 8.
On January 6, 1961, shortly before the inauguration of President Kennedy, Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that the communists would triumph not through
nuclear war, but through "national liberation" wars in the newly decolonized areas in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Id. Later in 1961, various Soviet publications an-
nounced that the Soviets planned to launch a geosynchronous communications satellite.
[VOL. 3:383
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States and ten other countries signed an Interim Executive Agreement
calling for the establishment of the International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium."' Seven years later, these eleven countries final-
ized permanent arrangements and established INTELSAT.1
7
INTELSAT has presided over the global telecommunications system
through an important period of the telecommunications revolution.'
The Early Bird, launched in 1965, was the first communications satel-
lite in the world and provided 240 voice channels."' By 1969, INTEL-
SAT had perfected its international telecommunications with the place-
ment over the Indian Ocean of the last of its third generation of
satellites, INTELSAT 111.20
From then on, satellites have provided for most of the growth in in-
ternational communications.2' INTELSAT VI, planned for launch in
1989, will carry 120,000 simultaneous two-way telephone circuits plus
three television channels. 22 Today, INTELSAT has 16 satellites in or-
bit23 that serve 173 countries24 through more than 1,000 satellite
paths25 connecting almost 400 earth station antennae.20 INTELSAT
carries two-thirds of the global television transmissions, 7 more than
The United States feared that four such satellites could blanket the entire world and
give the Soviet Union domination over the international communications satellite sys-
tem. Id.
16. See Sarreals, supra note 5, at 273 (discussing the international situation pre-
sent at the formulative stages of the Agreement).
17. Id.
18. Id. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 32. Long Range Goals in Interna-
tional Telecommunications and Information, Senate Committee on Commerce. Sci-
ence, and Transportation, 98th Cong. Ist Sess. 132-33 (1983) (Report of National
Telecommunications and Information Administration) [hereinafter NTIA Report].
The NTIA Report describes INTELSAT as "an unqualified, outstanding success on
institutional, financial, and operational grounds and must be considered a triumph of
the United States foreign policy." Id.
19. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 32.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In the alternative, INTELSAT VI can transmit 200 television channels in
an all video mode. Id. Address of Richard Colino, Director of INTELSAT, to the
Parliamentary and Scientific Committee of the House of Commons 6 (Jan. 22, 1985)
(available at INTELSAT) [hereinafter Colino before Parliamentary Committee] (ex-
plaining that future satellite communications will include scanning spot beams which
will give small earth stations their own personalized communications every millisec-
ond). Laser inter-satellite links will carry traffic directly from hemisphere to hemi-
sphere. Id.
23. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 32.
24. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 273 n.26.
25. NTIA Report, supra note 18, at 115-16.
26. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 31.
27. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 273 n.26. INTELSAT controls a much higher pro-
portion of intercontinental and transoceanic traffic, providing 98 percent of television
transmissions. Colino before Federal Communications Bar, supra note 9, at 3.
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360 two-way business service circuits,2" and most of the transoceanic
telecommunications traffic.2 The INTELSAT system brings modern
international telephone communications to the least developed nations
in the most remote areas of the world, and provides twenty-seven coun-
tries with their domestic communications systems.30 Many commenta-
tors have lauded the provision of these services to LDCs as advancing
the cause of international peace and good will. 31
B. THE DIVERSIFYING MARKET
The modern global telecommunications structure has evolved into
two contrasting markets: a diverse market in the most developed coun-
tries and a relatively simplistic market for the rest of the world.3 2 The
least developed countries now have a primary need for basic telecom-
munications services. 33 As countries move up the scale of development,
however, they demand more dynamic and sophisticated telecommunica-
tions services to satisfy their increasingly diverse economies and ad-
vanced technological needs.3 4 This becomes most apparent when a na-
INTELSAT carried over 49,000 hours of international television in 1984. Colino
before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 1. It carried eleven full-time inter-
national television leases in 1986. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 32. INTEL-
SAT offers 229 different video tariffs and services, including worldwide transmission of
the Olympic Games and World Cup Soccer Matches. Colino before Federal Communi-
cations Bar, supra at 9. It has transmitted global news events addressing political un-
rest in Libya and the Philippines, as well as the 1969 landing on the moon at Tranquil-
ity Base. Id. at 3. INTELSAT also makes possible the WORLDNET program of the
United States Information Agency. Id. at 3.
28. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 32. See also Colino before Federal
Communications Bar, supra note 9, at 3 (commenting that 1,951 banks in fifty-eight
countries transmit electronic funds through INTELSAT).
29. Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 2. INTELSAT car-
ries approximately 70,000 channels or two-thirds of the international telephone services
of the world. Id.
30. INTELSAT, Press Release No. 86-105 at 4 (Dec. 12, 1986) (available at
INTELSAT).
31. Reply Comments of the Nat'l Black Media Coalition, Transafrica, and the
American Committee on Africa at 3, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite Sys-
tems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (June 5,
1985) [hereinafter Reply Comments of Transafrica].
32. See Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transpon-
der Flow of Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 287, 294 (1981) (noting that there is
no competition in telecommunications services in most countries).
33. Snow, Regulation to Deregulation: The Telecommunications Sector and In-
dustrialization, 9 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 4, 281, 285 (1985).
34. Id. The dramatic advance of the international telecommunications needs of end
users, primarily businesses, enterprises, and organizations, has exceeded the ability of
any single supplier to meet them. Comments of Orion Satellite Corp. at 87, In the
Market Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications,
FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments of Orion]. Moreover,
studies reveal a growing international demand for foreign entertainment programming.
[VOL. 3:383
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tion transforms its economy from the industrial and manufacturing
sectors into the information sector.30
As the most advanced users of INTELSAT services gradually come
to rely more on international communications and consequently in-
crease the cost efficiency of their use of the INTELSAT system, LDCs
continue to lag behind, creating a disproportionate allocation of costs.30
The most developed nations generate the highest volume of interna-
tional telecommunications traffic and INTELSAT revenue.37 In con-
trast, the relative infrequency of international communications traffic in
LDCs results in the high cost of providing these services to those coun-
tries.38 Maintenance of a singular global telecommunications system
over these various markets is problematic. The remainder of this Com-
ment discusses various proposed solutions to this problem.
II. PRICE SUBSIDIZATION UNDER ARTICLE V(d)
Article V(d) of the INTELSAT agreement requires that the cost to
all customers for use of the INTELSAT system remain the same for
each type of service even though telecommunications in geographic ar-
eas with high volumes of traffic (high density countries or areas) is
more cost-efficient than telecommunications in areas with low volumes
Comments of ESPN, Inc. at 17, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems
Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985).
35. See Comments of Technova, Inc. at 30-31, In the Matter of Establishment of
Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299
(Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments of Technova] (asserting that the Pacific market,
for example, is presently growing rapidly in terms of trade and diversifying its telecom-
munications needs). Demand for more sophisticated, tailor-made telecommunications
for the industrialized countries is expected to grow at an exponential rate. Snow. supra
note 33, at 287.
36. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 6. Approximately one-fourth
of INTELSAT members are Western, developed countries while the remaining three-
fourths represent the developing world and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). See
Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 5. The twenty-five devel-
oped countries own approximately two-thirds of INTELSAT's shares, corresponding to
two-thirds use. Id.
37. Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 6.
38. Id. Sixty percent of all INTELSAT international antennae are located in devel-
oping countries. Id. It is estimated that 50 percent of the 1,500 INTELSAT earth
stations generate less than 10 percent of INTELSAT's revenues. Compare Recent De-
velopment, INTELSAT, 1 At. U. J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 413, 418 n.24 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Recent Development, INTELSAT] (observing that Sub-Saharan Africa has a total
of 174 earth stations, an average of four per country or one for every two million
people) with Guttman, Telecommunications and Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 TELECOMIU-
NICATIONS Po'Y at 325, 332 (1986) (commenting that Sweden, Denmark, Finland,
and Norway, with more than 22 million people, bear more traffic using a single shared
station).
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of traffic (low density countries or areas).39 Such inflexibility under ar-
ticle V(d) results in the high density areas subsidizing the development
and use of international telecommunications in the low density areas.
40
Consequently, the low density countries pay less for their circuit capac-
ity through INTELSAT than they would in a system subject to mar-
ketplace pricing.41 Thus, the high density countries pay more for using
INTELSAT space capacity than they would if the international tele-
communications market were open to competition. 42 This causes distor-
tions in the marketplace. 43 This price gap between the natural market-
place price and the inflated price of INTELSAT subsidization creates
39. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(d). When the transponder of a
satellite carries a single, large traffic stream, or high power spot beam, between two
locations, the cost per channel is lower than when it carries many traffic streams, or
broad antenna beams, among many locations. Comments of Walter N. Hinchman at
17, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Com-
munication, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Hinchman Com-
ments]. For example, no single African communications route can fill the channel ca-
pacity of a transponder. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 6.
Consequently, the cost per channel is higher than that needed to carry a large stream
of traffic between high density locations. Id.
40. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, at preamble. See International Satellite
Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 797,
811 (1984) (statement of Walter Hinchman, Pres., Walter Hinchman and Assoc., Inc.)
[hereinafter Hinchman before Telecommunications Subcommittee] (explaining that
cross subsidies exist between various INTELSAT members, geographic regions, and
services). Under cross subsidization, more profitable, high density routes allow for the
assessment of lower charges for unprofitable, low density routes. See also Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, § 102(b), 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1982) (stating that the
United States will direct care and attention to providing such services to economically
less developed countries).
41. Hinchman Comments, supra note 39, at 17.
42. See id. at 17 (stating that strictly commercial enterprises would find it neces-
sary to charge lower rates on high-volume routes than INTELSAT currently charges
on those same routes). Because the cost of satellite communications is relatively dis-
tance insensitive, the cost of a call between San Francisco and New York should be the
same as a call from New York to London. Comments of the Bureaus of Competition,
Economics, and Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission at 8, In the
Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications
FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments of Federal Trade
Commission]. Instead, the cost of a call from New York to London is approximately
three times the cost of a similar call from New York to San Francisco. Id. at 8-9.
Similarly, one hour of transcontinental video transmission costs $790, compared to a
price of $2,700 for. a transatlantic transmission. Id. at 9.
43. See Comments of American Telephone & Telegraph Co., at 43, In the Matter
of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications FCC
Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments of AT&T] (stating that
economists consider cross-subsidies a poor method of achieving desirable social goals).
Subsidies distort market pricing and often promote uneconomic behavior in the market-
place. Id. Such cross-subsidies are not sustainable because traffic will be lost to compet-
itors of INTELSAT. Id.
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an incentive for private entrepreneurs to enter the communications
market in high density areas, hoping to undersell INTELSAT
services."
This bifurcated telecommunications market creates a dilemma in
fostering the optimal evolution of a global network. The international
telecommunications system faces the task of fostering the natural
evolution of a market for the most advanced services while protecting
the markets of the least advanced countries. The solution to this prob-
lem is that the supply side of international satellite telecommunications
must adapt to the rapid advance of demand and charge prices that are
more reflective of the marketplace.45 Yet some form of regulation of
the supply side is necessary to prevent serious harm which may occur if
the forces of the marketplace are allowed to govern unchecked.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF SEPARATE SYSTEMS
The greatest challenge to INTELSAT's monopoly of the supply side
came from its most advanced customer, the United States. The Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962 (the Act) declared that it is the pur-
pose and policy of the United States to establish, in cooperation with
other countries, a global commercial communications satellite network
responsive to public needs and national objectives. 40 The statute allows
private entrepreneurs to establish additional satellite systems provided
that the systems are in the national interest or meet unique governmen-
tal needs.47 On November 28, 1984, pursuant to the authority provided
in sections 701(d) and 721(a)(6) of the Act, President Reagan deter-
mined that the national interest required separate systems.48 Conse-
quently, on July 25, 1985, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) adopted a Report and Order granting several applications to
establish separate, private international communication satellite sys-
44. Hinchman Comments, supra note 39, at 17.
45. See Comments of Technova, supra note 35, at 28-29 (stating that the Pacific
region as well as other regions require systems that are innovative, high quality, easy to
use, readily switched from one application to another, and capable of integration).
Users complain, however, that the supplier, who defines the product, cannot tailor it to
meet the changing needs of each user. Id.
46. Communications Satellite Act, § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
47. Id. § 102(d), 47 U.S.C. § 701(d). The Act gives the President the authority to
determine whether separate systems are required to meet unique governmental needs or
are otherwise required in the national interest. Id. § 201(a)(6), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6).
48. Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (1984). Due to its
volume of international telecommunications traffic and its international leadership role,
only the United States has the ability to unilaterally deviate from INTELSAT. Com-
ments of Abbott Washburn, supra note 9, at II.
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tems.49 These separate systems, when eventually launched, still will not
49. Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, Report and Order,
50 Fed. Reg. 42,266 (1985) [hereinafter FCC Report and Order]. In the Report and
Order, the FCC granted conditional authorization to the applications of RCA Commu-
nications, Inc. (RCA), International Satellite Inc. (ISI), and PanAmerican Satellite
Corporation (PanAmSat), and gave Orion Satellite Corporation (Orion) and Cygnus
Satellite Corporation (Cygnus) 45 days to modify their proposals to ensure a more
efficient use of the frequency spectrum. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 292 n.150. Eventu-
ally, the Commission granted final authority to all applicants. Colino before Federal
Communications Bar, supra note 9, at 15.
The ISI proposed system consists of two orbiting satellites and one ground spare that
would connect the United States and Europe. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 292 n. 150. The
satellites have thirty-two transponders each and would carry video, audio, and data
transmissions. Id. The total system would cost an estimated $230 million. Id.
The RCA proposal consists of an antenna design modification of a previously author-
ized domestic satellite, SATCOMVI, to carry video, audio, and data transmission ser-
vices between Europe and Africa. Id. Modification of the satellite will cost an esti-
mated $700 million. Id.
The Orion system consists of two orbiting satellites, with 22 transponders each, and
one ground spare. Id. The satellites will provide video, audio, and data services to the
eastern United States and Western Europe. Id.
The Cygnus system proposes to provide digital communications services, including
video teleconferencing, high-speed facsimile, computer to computer communications,
remote printing, teletext, videotext, and data collection and distribution. Id. The system
will supply services via two orbiting satellites with one ground spare, each with 16
transponders. Id. The satellites will serve the continental United States and Western
Europe, and will provide services via spot beam to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the
Caribbean Basin, and parts of Central America. Id.
The PanAmSat proposal consists of two orbiting satellites providing domestic satel-
lite services to Latin America with subregional video and audio distribution services
between New York, Miami, and Latin American countries. Id. PanAmSat will sell or
lease transponder capacity to television and radio networks, international news organi-
zations, and private and governmental parties. Id. The total estimated cost of the sys-
tem is $198 million. Id.
In May of 1986, Comsat and Peru requested the initiation of formal consultations
required under article XIV(d) to consider the PanAmSat proposal. Statement of D.
Leive, Legal Advisor to INTELSAT Before the Int'l Bar Ass'n Concerning the Inter-
national Telecommunication & Satellite Organization (Sept. 19, 1986) (available at
INTELSAT) [hereinafter Leive before Int'l Bar Ass'n]. On December 12, 1986, the
Board of Governors at the 69th Meeting of INTELSAT decided to advise the next
INTELSAT Assembly of Parties to reach favorable findings on the proposed PanAm-
Sat network. INTELSAT Board of Governors Recommends Coordination of the Pro-
posed PanAmSat Satellite Network, FCC Release No. 86-105, 2 (Dec. 12, 1986)
(available at INTELSAT). The Board noted that the transponders of the PanAmSat
network will be technically compatible with the use of the radio frequency spectrum
and orbital space by existing or planned INTELSAT space segments; that PanAmSat
will not cause significant economic harm to INTELSAT's global system; and that
PanAmSat will not prejudice the establishment of direct telecommunication links
through the INTELSAT space segment among all participants. Id. In March of 1986,
Columbia Communications Corporation also filed an application with the FCC for au-
thority to construct, launch, and operate a transpacific satellite system linking portions
of North America and Asia. In the Matter of Columbia Communications Corp., FCC
Release No. 86-536 (released Dec. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, FEDCOM library, FCC File).
The FCC granted the requested authority in December of 1986. Id.
In January of 1987, the FCC granted authority to McCaw Space Technologies, Inc.
[VOL.. 3:383
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provide service for several years. For example, these FCC-authorized
systems have not yet obtained foreign correspondents, financing, insur-
ance, or even potential customers.5 0 Thus, barriers to entry into private
systems of international telecommunications satellite services remain
extremely high.51
A. THE DISADVANTAGES OF SEPARATE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
Although their operations will be limited to customized services, pri-
to launch, operate, and construct a satellite system named Celestar. In the Matter of
McCaw Space Technologies, Inc., FCC Release No. 87-1 (released Jan. 15, 1987)
(LEXIS, FEDCOM library, FCC file). McCaw plans to serve multinational businesses,
financial institutions, international organizations, and video programmers and distribu-
tors. Id.
50. Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 2. INTELSAT's
portion of a bill for a typical international phone call amounts to only eight-percent,
with the remaining 92% going to the providers of terrestrial services, equipment, and
maintenance, including earth stations. Id.
51. Colino before Federal Communications Bar, supra note 9, at 15. Articles IV(d)
and (e) provide that any Signatory, Party or entity within INTELSAT's jurisdiction
wishing to establish a separate public fixed or mobile satellite system for international
telecommunication services must furnish all relevant information to and consult with
INTELSAT's Assembly of Parties. Id. Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement
requires that separate systems must be approved by the Assembly of Parties prior to
their implementation. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, arts. XIV(d),(e).
Separate systems must meet certain criteria for approval: 1) technical compatibility
with facilities of the separate systems with INTELSAT with regard to the use of the
radio frequency spectrum; and 2) the separate systems must not cause "significant eco-
nomic harm to INTELSAT." Id.
Negotiations leading to the adoption of article XIV(d) involved a debate concerning
the degree of economic harm to INTELSAT allowable from separate systems. Sar-
reals, supra note 5, at 293 n.151. A United States view in the debate wanted to bar
"any economic harm" and an opposing group wanted to prohibit only "substantial eco-
nomic harm." Id. The wording "significant economic harm" was a compromise. Id.
COMSAT argues that the debates focused on the establishment of limited regional
systems, that would compete only peripherally with INTELSAT, and not on separate
systems established to compete directly with INTELSAT. Id.
But see Recent Development, INTELSAT, supra note 38, at 416-17 n.16 (noting
that the "one or more foreign authorities" requirement effectively circumvents article
XIV(d). The requirement propounded in the White Paper that separate systems obtain
approval from one or more foreign authorities rather than the entire Assembly of Par-
ties increases the likelihood of the establishment of separate systems because it is far
easier for a proposed separate system to appeal to the national interests of one or more
foreign authorities with similar interests than to persuade the entire Assembly of
Parties.
Congress, however, provided further restriction on the "one or more foreign authori-
ties" requirement. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 146, 99
Stat. 405, 425 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 (1985). The Act provides that
should the Assembly of Parties fail to approve a separate system, and the President
determines to pursue the separate system, the Secretary of State shall submit a report
to Congress setting forth the foreign policy reasons for the President's determination,
and a plan to minimize negative effects of the separate system. Id.
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vate systems will compete for traffic presently routed through the IN-
TELSAT system. 2 These separAte systems will cause economic loss to
INTELSAT in several ways: 1) the vast majority of separate systems
will seek the high density markets where they can underprice INTEL-
SAT and obtain a larger profit than they would by establishing routes
servicing low density areas53 and, 2) the separate systems will divert
anticipated traffic, and the revenues generated by that traffic, for which
INTELSAT had incurred costs." Moreover, separate satellite systems
will harm foreign markets in both the developed55 and underdeveloped
world."6
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF SEPARATE SYSTEMS
1. The Ideal of Competition
The FCC decision to permit separate, private international commu-
nications systems reflects a dominant theme in United States economic
policy that urges opening telecommunications to marketplace forces so
as to bring about competitive and efficient rates, promote higher qual-
ity and a wider variety of services, and develop innovative technology.
5 7
52. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 287 n. 19.
53. Rein, McDonald, Adams, Fraule & Nelsen, Implementation of a U.S. "Free
Entry" Initiative for Transatlantic Satellite Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls, and Pos-
sibilities, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 459, 481 (1985) [hereinafter Rein].
54. See Walter Hinchman Assoc., The Economics of International Satellite Com-
munications at vi, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing Inter-
national Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (May 18, 1984) [hereinafter Eco-
nomics of Communications] (stating that the separate systems would divert
INTELSAT traffic, raising the cost per unit of utilized capacity and causing INTEL-
SAT considerable economic harm); see also Comments of Abbott Washburn, supra
note 9, at 3 (warning that a proliferation of separate systems may lead to the eventual
break-up of INTELSAT).
55. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing the resulting harm to
the Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Ministries (PTTs) if INTELSAT incurs
lost revenues from the establishment of separate satellite systems).
56. See id. (noting that separate systems challenge the viability of a single, global
INTELSAT system and threaten unbearable satellite circuit cost increases for coun-
tries in low density areas). Authorities from Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Fin-
land, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Vatican have expressed their opposition to sepa-
rate satellite systems.
57. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 270. One key reason behind the emergence of private
competition is the failure of INTELSAT to meet all international communications de-
mands. Comments of Orion, supra note 34, at 87; see also Comments of Gannett Co.
Inc., at 4, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International
Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) (analogizing from the do-
mestic market to conclude that competition maximizes consumer welfare in terms of
availability, price, quality, and reliability); Comments of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, supra note 42, at 8 (stating that the introduction of separate satellite systems
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The applicants for separate systems claim that private services will of-
fer the following advantages: 1) lower circuit costs than INTELSAT;
2) a complete circuit from customer premises to customer premises
through a single carrier, rather than through the number of actors
presently required under the INTELSAT system; and 3) the ability to
connect the user to the international satellite system through transmit-
ters and receivers located on the premises of the customer.""
2. INTELSAT as Competitor
Although the implementation of separate systems has not yet oc-
curred, the challenge of separate systems to INTELSAT has wrought
tremendous changes to the market."9 INTELSAT has begun to intro-
duce a wide variety of customized services such as the distribution of
financial information, environmental and scientific data, cash manage-
ment operations, and video conferencing. INTELSAT is determined to
meet all market demands and effectively eliminate its competitors. 0°
would satisfy customer needs and will lead to greater innovation).
Because INTELSAT is the sole provider of international satellite communications
circuits, the United States government has called it a "monopoly." Sarreals, supra note
5, at 294. The FCC approved the separate systems because they believed that competi-
tion, rather than monopoly, would better serve the international telecommunications
market. Id. at 295.
58. Rein, supra note 53, at 471. Utilization of private switched systems is an effec-
tive means of capturing substantial portions of the computer networking market. Re-
cent Development, INTELSAT, supra note 38, at 417 n.20. Users with compatible
data systems could link up directly with the private system without having to hook up
into the public-switched system. Id. The increase in personal computer sales will help
utilize private-switched systems. Id. In 1984, one-in-four million office personal com-
puters were linked in private-switched networks. Id. The Gartner Group, a Connecticut
consultant, predicts that by 1989 nearly 19 million or three-quarters of all computers
will be linked to other computers. Id.
59. Comments of Pan American Satellite Corp., In the Matter of Establishment of
Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, at 2, FCC Docket No. 84-
1299 (April 1, 1985).
60. See INTELSAT Press Release 86-33 (May 22, 1986) (available at
INTELSAT) (explaining that INTELSAT responds to the expansion of separate satel-
lite systems through new service offerings and price structure changes); Casatelli,
supra note 8, at 44 (confirming that INTELSAT has improved its technology in modu-
lation techniques, spectrum efficiency, higher powered satellites and less costly earth
stations); id. at 12-13 (arguing that INTELSAT has become a truly market oriented
network by combining current developments with new traffic aggregation and switching
techniques); see also Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 34 (observing that the
threat of competition has made INTELSAT more responsive to market demands).
The rapidly changing telecommunications market increases demands for high-speed
and wideband data services, video and audio related services, low cost services, and for
facilities under the control of or near the customers rather than handled through long-
distance carriers. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 12-13. By providing wider
coverage and closer connectivity to customer premises, INTELSAT has become more
flexible in meeting the needs of its users. Colino before Federal Communications Bar,
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An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of separate satellite
systems highlights the need to maintain the potential for separate sys-
tems because the threat of the introduction of separate systems forces
INTELSAT to behave as though competition already existed. Simulta-
neously, INTELSAT must effectively shut out these competitor sys-
tems so as to protect both the investor-owners of INTELSAT and the
markets of LDCs. Although proving effective in meeting these particu-
lar market demands, the question remains whether INTELSAT can
continue to meet demands placed upon it at prices necessary to narrow
competition."'
IV. PRICE FLEXIBILITY IN INTELSAT
As a result of the United States proposal to allow separate satellite
systems, many members of INTELSAT have acknowledged that IN-
TELSAT must have greater pricing flexibility to compete effectively
with the private systems.62 In 1985, the United States Congress
supra note 9, at 12-13. INTELSAT is exploring the concept of "Transponder Rights of
Use" (TRU). Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 9-10. This
service, subject to the approval of the members of INTELSAT, will establish exclusive
connections between two or more users. Id. This service will not only cater to high
density traffic users but also will facilitate efficiency while maximizing utilization of
capacity. Id.
Cf. Comments of Orion, supra note 34, at 88 (stating that the incentive of
INTELSAT to serve new market needs will disappear if alternatives are eliminated).
While INTELSAT offered only 12 new services from 1973 to 1983, the governing
board of INTELSAT approved 356 new digital services between 1984 and mid-1986
including 187 types of television services and 154 types of integrated digital services.
Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 33. The Integrated Services Digital Network
(ISDN) and Intelsat Business Services (IBS) control worldwide audio and video
teleconferencing, distribution of audio program material, high and low-speed facsimile,
high and low-speed data transfer, data collection and distribution, remote newspaper
printing, packet switching, digital voice, electronic mail and document distribution,
electronic funds transfer, and telex data gathering and distribution service using micro
terminals as small as two feet in diameter and basic satellite facilities for rural and
remote communities. INTELSAT, Press Release No. 86-105, at 4 (Dec. 12, 1986).
61. See Comments of International Satellite Inc. at 73, In the Matter of Establish-
ment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No.
84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Comments on International Satellite Inc.] (warn-
ing that because INTELSAT is essentially a business, it is doomed to fail unless it
responds to marketplace realities).
62. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 34. See Leive before Int'l Bar Ass'n,
supra note 49, at 13 (noting that prior to 1985, Tanzania and Cameroon submitted a
proposal to amend article V(d), permitting greater pricing flexibility to meet competi-
tion when it was in the best interests of INTELSAT). See also Comments of AT&T,
supra note 43, at 31 (recommending that INTELSAT have the ability to allow prices
to fluctuate by geographic region as an additional competitive option). If INTELSAT
is not allowed to set its prices competitively, such price inflexibility will permit competi-
tors to capture market shares regardless of their relative efficiency. Comments of Ab-
bott Washburn, supra note 9, at 24. Circumstances like these defeat the purpose of
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amended the Department of State Authorization Bill" and the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 19624 in order to address the problems of
limitations on the pricing flexibility of INTELSAT. The amendment to
the Communications Satellite Act authorizes the Secretary of State to
consult with INTELSAT regarding the appropriate modification of ar-
ticle V(d) to permit greater price flexibility.6"
Presently, article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement gives the
INTELSAT Board of Governors considerable latitude to set rates on
the basis of such operational parameters as voice, television, data,
power, bandwidth, type of satellite capacity, degree of protection, and
other specifications. 6  The position of the United States is that no
amendment to article V(d) is necessary because these parameters, if
utilized, already provide sufficient pricing flexibility.
67
introducing competition to improve market efficiency. Id.
63. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-93 § 146, 99 Stat. 405,
425 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 (1985)).
64. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1982).
65. Id. The Act states:
The Secretary of State shall consult with the United States signatory to INTEL-
SAT and the Secretary of Commerce regarding the appropriate scope and char-
acter of a modification to article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement which
would permit INTELSAT to establish cost-based rates for individual traffic
routes, as exceptional circumstances warrant, paying particular attention to the
need for avoiding significant economic harm to the global system of INTELSAT
as well as United States national and foreign policy interests.
Id.
66. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art V(d) which states in pertinent part
... All users of the INTELSAT space segment shall pay utilization charges deter-
mined in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Operating Agree-
ment." Id.
Article X of the INTELSAT Agreement provides that the Board of Governors shall
periodically establish rates of charge for space segment utilization of INTELSAT
space segment capacity. Id. art. X(viii).
Article VIII of the INTELSAT Agreement empowers the Meeting of the Signatories
"to establish general rules, upon the recommendation of and for the guidance of the
Board of Governors, concerning.. .(c) the establishment and adjustment of the rates of
charge for utilization of the INTELSAT space segment on a non-discriminatory basis."
Id. art. VIII(v)(c). See also Leive before Int'l Bar Ass'n, supra note 49, at 12 (listing
parameters for the Board of Governors).
67. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 34; see FCC Report and Order, supra
note 49, at 42,305 (stating that INTELSAT possesses sufficient, but not complete,
price flexibility). The Secretaries of State and Commerce jointly issued a "White Pa-
per" indicating the official United States position. SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP, supra
note 4, at 1. The position of the United States with regard to INTELSAT is highly
influential. Comments of the National Black Media Coalition, Transafrica, and the
American Committee of Africa at 9, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985) [herein-
after Comments of Transafrica]. The United States share of INTELSAT was 24% in
1985. Id. See also Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 7 (noting
that the share of investment in INTELSAT determines the voting in the Board of
Governors). Article V(b) of the INTELSAT Agreement provides that each Signatory
is to maintain an investment share equal in proportion to its percentage of utilization of
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Although INTELSAT provides some pricing flexibility, this flexibil-
ity is limited.6 8 Article V(d) permits the Board of Governors to devise
the INTELSAT space segment. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(b). But
see Comments of Abbott Washburn, supra note 9, at 23 (criticizing the White Paper
for not clearly addressing the extent of price flexibility issue). If the United States fails
to take a clear position and substantive corrective action, INTELSAT will not be able
to compete effectively. Id.
68. See Comments of AT&T, supra note 43, at 32 (stating that while INTELSAT
may well be equipped to compete under current circumstances, it must also be allowed
to price on an incremental cost basis to effectively compete in the future).
In response to the United States proposal for separate systems, the Assembly of Par-
ties of INTELSAT requested that the Board of Governors use the inherent flexibility
provided by article V(d). Leive before Int'l Bar Ass'n, supra note 49, at 12. To test the
degree of price flexibility inherent in article V(d), the INTELSAT Director General
and Board of Governors authorized, in principle, the establishment of a system for
closed digital business services in the Caribbean region (CARIBNET) at half the price
charged for similar services elsewhere. See Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 34
(noting that recognition of the need to charge different rates for similar services offered
in different ocean regions constituted a major philosophical change in INTELSAT
policies).
The establishment of a fifty-percent discount for the Caribbean region violates the
INTELSAT Treaty because it lies beyond the parameters of article V(d) pricing flexi-
bility. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27, art. 31(1), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 692-93
(1969), entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (providing
that good faith compliance is required by signatories in accordance with the terms of a
treaty).
Many of the nations represented by INTELSAT are signatories to the Vienna Con-
vention. Letter from Arnold & Porter to David M. Leive, Legal Advisor to INTEL-
SAT (Dec. 13, 1984) (available at FCC Docket No. 84-1299) [hereinafter Arnold &
Porter Letter]. The Vienna Convention is widely recognized, even by non-parties such
as the United States, as the definitive statement of international law on the question of
treaty interpretation. Letter by Wiley & Rein to David Leive, Legal Advisor to IN-
TELSAT (Dec. 19, 1984) (available at FCC Docket No. 84-1299) [hereinafter Wiley
& Rein Letter]. A plain reading of article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement prohib-
its geographic price differentials for the same service. Vienna Convention, supra, art
V(d). Article V(d) of the INTELSAT agreement expressly prohibits discounts of ser-
vice pricing for one type of customer while other customers pay higher prices for the
same service. Article V(d) states definitively that "the rates of space segment utiliza-
tion shall be the same for all applicants for space segment capacity for that type of
utilization." Id.
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention also provides that the ordinary meaning
given to the terms of a treaty should be derived from the context of its preamble,
annexes, and related agreements. Id. art. 31(2). The Preamble of the INTELSAT
Agreement and the Agreement establishing Interim Arrangements state the purposes
and intentions of INTELSAT signatories to prohibit price discrimination on the bases
of types of users, cost efficiency, or geographic location. INTELSAT Agreement, supra
note 9, at preamble. See also G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6-7,
U.N. Doc. a15100 (1962) (setting forth the principle that communications by means of
satellites should be available to the nations of the world on a global and non-discrimi-
natory basis); Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements, supra note 6, at pream-
ble (recalling that communications by satellite require a non-discriminatory availability
among nations).
The Vienna Convention further provides that "all involved parties to a treaty respect
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
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and adapt new services to the market in answer to the threat of com-
petitors.69 The classification of these new services, however, must rely
on bona fide technical or operational factors as distinguished from
other types of utilization."0 Should INTELSAT, in an attempt to fully
meet the challenge of private competitors, establish some pricing flexi-
bility among customers based on geographic location or on efficiency-
of-use basis, it would violate article V(d).7 1 INTELSAT may offer new
services at competitive rates only as long as high density customers buy
the new services.7 2 Once customers in low density areas begin to re-
quest the new services, then the costs to INTELSAT for providing
those services will rise.7 3 The price increases will inflate charges to high
density customers and open price gaps, thereby enabling competitors to
offer services at market rates which undersell INTELSAT.
7 4
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE V(d)
A. THE PUBLIC SWITCHED-MESSAGE MARKET
While various groups and individuals have recognized the necessity
for price flexibility,75 the extent of price flexibility in INTELSAT still
requires definition. In response to the concerns of the other investors to
INTELSAT regarding separate systems, the United States delegation
to the 16th Meeting of INTELSAT Signatories assured the other
members that the United States would not propose a separate system
under article XIV(d) if it believed that the introduction of separate
systems would cause significant economic harm to INTELSAT."8 The
United States delegation also stated that the separate system would not
subject the core of INTELSAT revenues to diversion77 because the
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation. . . ." Vienna Convention, supra, art.
31(3)(b).
Since 1973, the Board of Governors has interpreted the phrase "type of utilization"
in article V(d) to mean different types of services or service offerings, without applica-
tion to the specific links or users. Arnold & Porter Letter, supra at 7.
69. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility in estab-
lishing new services).
70. Wiley & Rein Letter, supra note 68, at 6.





75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (listing proponents for price
flexibility).
76. INTELSAT, Press Release No. 86-21 (Apr. 10, 1986) [hereinafter INTEL-
SAT, Press Release No. 86-21].
77. Id.
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United States imposed operational restrictions under the FCC Order
creates only a limited area of competition between INTELSAT and the
separate systems. 8 Under service restrictions imposed by the FCC Re-
port and Order, INTELSAT will retain complete control over the pub-
lic switched-message markets .7  The restrictions prohibit competitor
systems from providing traditionally public services, allowing INTEL-
SAT to maintain price averaging without the threat of traffic diversion
to the separate systems.80 Thus, within the public markets, services
among high-density, cost-efficient areas can subsidize services to low
density, cost-inefficient areas and preserve telecommunications markets
in LDCs. 1
B. DISTINGUISHING THE NO-INTERCONNECTION RESTRICTION
Under the FCC restriction, separate satellite systems may only pro-
vide services through the sale or long-term lease of space segment ca-
pacity for communications not interconnected with the public switched-
message networks.8 2 The FCC requires that all separate systems licen-
sees place the "no-interconnection" restriction in all lease agreements
78. Id.
79. See FCC Report and Order, supra note 49, at 42,287 (describing public
switched-message networks as facilities established by international common carriers to
provide public switched-message service, such as MTS, telex, TWX, telegraph, teletext,
facsimile, and high-speed switched data services).
80. Id. at 42,282-42,292.
81. Id. at 42,306 n.139.
82. See id. at 42,287-88 (stating that the intent of the restrictions is to prohibit
licensees of separate systems from operating as common carriers); Presidential Deter-
mination No. 85-2, at 46,987 (directing the Secretaries of State and Commerce to
inform the FCC of the necessary criteria to ensure that the United States fulfills its
international obligations and pursues its foreign policy and telecommunications inter-
ests). The Secretaries of State and Commerce stated that each system may only pro-
vide services through the sale or long-term lease of transponders or space segment ca-
pacity for communications not interconnected with the public-switched message
networks, except for emergency restoration service. Id. One or more foreign authorities
shall authorize the use of each system and enter into consultation procedures with the
United States under article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement to ensure technical
compatibility and avoid significant economic harm to INTELSAT. Letter from Mal-
colm Baldridge and George P. Shultz to Mark S. Fowler (Nov. 28, 1984) (FCC
Docket No. 84-1299).
The FCC adopted further restrictions on separate systems as follows: 1) all licensees
would restrict alternative systems to the sale or long-term lease of transponders or
space segment capacity for communications not interconnected with public switched
message networks, except for emergency restoration; 2) these restrictions will apply to
separate systems operators as well as all levels of retailers and users of facilities; 3) the
minimum lease period for the "long-term lease" of capacity will be one year; 4) com-
mon carriers and enhanced service providers may obtain and resell space segment ca-
pacity for communications not interconnected with any public switched-message net-
work. FCC Report and Order, supra note 49, at 42,267, 42,282, 42,289.
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for space segment capacity and in sales contracts for the purchase of
transponders.83 The FCC is able to effectively enforce the "no-intercon-
nection" restriction through its monitoring of annual international traf-
fic data submitted by United States carriers.8 Any significant reduc-
tion in expected traffic levels between the United States and countries
served by the separate systems would indicate the possibility of restric-
tion violations.85 The FCC will also apply the "no-interconnection" re-
striction to foreign use of separate systems.86
The FCC's "no-interconnection" restriction provides an effective dis-
tinguishing line for a pricing flexibility amendment. This is so because
all services associated with the public switched-message network could
remain price inflexible without the danger that separate systems might
83. FCC Report and Order, supra note 49, at 42,267. See also INTELSAT, Press
Release No. 86-21, supra note 76, at 2-5 (available at INTELSAT) (citing detailed
responses by the United States Delegation to questions raised on separate systems).
The FCC has emphasized that all licensees have the responsibility of ensuring that
their systems are used in compliance with the operating restrictions. Id. at 2. Failure to
operate pursuant to the restrictions subjects licensees to revocation of licenses, mone-
tary fines, and other penalties. Id. Authorization of United States common carriers to
provide services is conditioned on compliance with the "no-interconnect" restriction and
will require tariffs to impose the restriction on customer use. Id. If carriers violate the
restrictions they cannot use the separate system. Id. Violation of the tariff restriction
by users will result in loss of service. Id. Users who resell separate systems capacity as
enhanced service providers to customers entering into sharing arrangements for sepa-
rate systems capacity must maintain written agreements that explicitly preclude inter-
connection and must file them with the FCC. Id. at 3.
All users which interconnect their separate system facilities to a private branch ex-
change (PBX) or similar equipment are required to configure their equipment to block
on-demand connections with the public switched-message networks. Id. Each user must
file a written certification sworn by a corporate official to the FCC expressing adher-
ence to the no-interconnection restriction. Id.
84. INTELSAT Press Release No. 86-21, supra note 76, at 4; see Comments of
International Satellite Inc., supra note 61, at 80, 81 (asserting that the affected parties
would honor the proposed restrictions because massive violations are easily detected);
Comments of Wold Communications Inc., In the Establishment of Satellite Systems
Providing International Communications, at 5-7, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1,
1985) (arguing that the conditions barring separate systems from the provision of pub-
lic-switched message services are legally justifiable and enforceable); Reply Comments
of Pan American Satellite Corp. at 17-18, In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite
Systems Providing International Communications, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (June 5,
1985) (arguing that the restrictions are enforceable because they will limit the number
of users of the new market entrants and that regulatory expertise is sufficiently sophis-
ticated to guard against violations).
85. INTELSAT Press Release 86-21, supra note 76, at 4. Due to its economic
incentive as a competitor of separate systems, AT&T is an effective monitor of restric-
tion violations. Id. AT&T can identify decreases in high density use of INTELSAT
through its billing records, which the Commission can then cross-check with its certifi-
cation file to uncover violators. Id.
86. Id. at 5. The FCC stated it would require that all operating agreements entered
into between separate system licensees and foreign authorities contain language up-
holding the no-interconnection restriction. Id.
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divert the high density traffic."7 Conversely, price flexibility could ex-
tend to newer customized services not interconnected with the public
switched-message networks to meet the challenge of competition in this
specified area.88
Other members of INTELSAT suggest that an amendment to article
V(d) is not necessary because there are, as of mid-1986, no established
separate systems.8 9 Such a position provides the opportunity for sepa-
rate systems to enter the market and calls for increased INTELSAT
pricing flexibility only after the competitors have gained hold. Rather
than postponing a modification until it faces actual competition, the
better approach would adopt an amendment now to meet the threat of
competition and to preclude the establishment of separate systems.
VI. NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE
DEVELOPED WORLD
A. THE EUROPEAN NEED TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF REVENUE
FROM INTELSAT
The Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications Ministries (PTTs) are
the dominant regulatory powers in European telecommunications. °
Until recently, European PTTs have had almost exclusive control over
the operation of domestic and international telecommunications."1 The
PTTs have a strong interest in a modification of article V(d) that
87. See supra note 82 (noting that the FCC restricts separate systems to provision
of services not interconnected with the public switched-message network). The Board
of Governors would retain the ability to set the charges for the utilization of each
service within the parameters set forth in articles V(d) and X. INTELSAT would offer
public switched-message networks and all services interconnected with them at the
same rates for utilization between all customers on a non-discriminatory basis. See
INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(d) (establishing that all users shall pay
the same rate). But see Comments of Abbott Washburn, supra note 9, at 15-16 (warn-
ing that the FCC must define the term "customized services" with precision so as to
limit its scope).
88. See Hinchman Comment, supra note 39, at 16 (noting that where INTELSAT
is allowed to set prices competitively, its vast economies of scale would render it a
formidable rival). Whereas competitors are restricted to offering services of this nature,
permitting INTELSAT to offer the same services at purely market rates provides IN-
TELSAT the advantage of preempting the market before competitors can gain hold
and damage INTELSAT's exclusive control over these crucial markets. Id. An amend-
ment to article V(d) that allowed INTELSAT to price competitive services not inter-
connected with the public switched-message network would effectively preclude the es-
tablishment of separate systems.
89. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 34.
90. See Rein, supra note 53, at 474 (noting that PTTs have regulatory power simi-
lar to the FCC and operating authority comparable to United States private sector
licensees).
91. Id. at 475 n.73.
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would grant greater price flexibility as a means of preventing the diver-
sion of high density traffic and revenues which would accompany the
establishment of separate systems. The PTTs are the Signatories to the
INTELSAT Agreement on behalf of their respective countries and
would suffer from any economic losses to INTELSAT. 2 INTELSAT,
which has no autonomous identity, acts as the agent of the Signatories
which owns and operates satellites on their behalf. 3 The Signatories
contribute the operating costs for the network, bear the risk of invest-
ment, and hold the primary responsibility for marketing the services of
INTELSAT directly to customers." Revenues of INTELSAT are in
the form of INTELSAT Utilization Charges (IUCs) 5 which are as-
signed to the Signatories. 6 The Signatories recover their contributions
only if actual demand equals or exceeds the demand projected at the
beginning of the planning period.9 7 If INTELSAT's revenues are insuf-
ficient, then the signatories are not fully reimbursed for their contribu-
92. See id. at 484-86 (noting that the PTTs, like COMSAT, are the investor/own-
ers of INTELSAT). Each Signatory shall have an investment share in the use of IN-
TELSAT space segments which is determined by its own use of INTELSAT capacity
relative to use by other members. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(d).
Each member, therefore, is harmed by lower levels of utilization of capacity. Econom-
ices of Communications, supra note 54, at ii. The PTTs perceive the introduction of
separate systems as an economic threat and a threat to their operational sovereignty.
Sarreals, supra note 5, at 302 n.210.
93. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 285. INTELSAT provides the capacity that Signato-
ries can use jointly for the purposes of routing traffic between and among their respec-
tive networks. Economics of Communications, supra note 54, at ii.
94. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 285. See Colino, INTELSAT: Doing Business in
Outer Space, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 53 (1967) [hereinafter Doing Business
in Outer Space] (discussing the manner in which capital operating maintenance and
administrative costs are divided between owners and users).
Signatories make annual contributions to INTELSAT proportional to their utiliza-
tion of the system and based on projected costs of providing services for the upcoming
planning period. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 295.
95. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 285.
96. Id. at 286. INTELSAT deals directly with its Signatories. Id. The Signatories
then pass the overall costs to their customers. Id. The customers of the Signatories
ultimately absorb any economic harm suffered by INTELSAT. Id. INTELSAT retains
only the amount required to cover operation and maintenance expenses. Id. at 286.
INTELSAT returns the surplus revenue to the signatories in proportion to their owner-
ship and usage. Id.
97. Id. at 295. Typically, INTELSAT retains a surplus in space segment capacity
because it allows excess capacity to remain available for immediate switching to pre-
vent interruption if circuits in usage malfunction; and surplus often results from poor
planning. Id. at 296 n.169. The inherent lumpiness of capacity additions compared to
gradual changes in demand, the loss of capacity due satellite relocations, and the uni-
versal connectivity requirement of services are other reasons why total capacity exceeds
usage. Economics of Communications, supra note 54, at iv. The connectivity require-
ment necessarily entails replacing older satellites with higher capacity satellites before
the expiration of the usable capacity of the older satellites. Id.
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tions and bear the resulting loss.98
B. TELECOMMUNICATIONS CHANGES IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD
The price averaging practice of the INTELSAT network compels
those signatories who utilize the most advanced and dynamic technol-
ogy to subsidize the least efficient users of those services." Conse-
quently, the high cost of telecommunications in the least developed and
most isolated regions of the world impedes the growth of state-of-the-
art international telecommunications services. President Reagan's de-
termination that separate satellite systems are in the national interest
of the most advanced user of INTELSAT, the United States, indicates
that the INTELSAT pricing system is presently insufficient for optimal
growth in the most advanced nations. Elsewhere in the developed world
and the industrializing countries, emerging forces are pressuring for
liberalization, privatization and competition in telecommunications. Al-
though the FCC authorized the original six proposed separate systems,
implementation has yet to take place. New pressures from the devel-
oped world, however, may soon produce new competitors to
INTELSAT.
1. The British Prototype
The approach of the United Kingdom typifies the future of telecom-
munications policy in the developed world. In the United Kingdom, the
British Post Office (BPO) had traditionally monopolized telecommuni-
cations services and equipment.100 The British government, in July
1980, however, announced plans to terminate the telecommunications
monopoly of the BPO.101 The British Telecommunications Act of
1981102 created the British Telecommunications Corporation (British
Telecom or BT) as a new public corporation to handle the telecommu-
nications and data processing business of the BPO. 103 Forms of compe-
98. Economics of Communications, supra note 54, at iv. See Doing Business in
Outer Space, supra note 94, at 53 (noting that INTELSAT Signatories must meet the
operating, maintenance, and administrative costs of the space segment, if IUC revenues
are insufficient).
99. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(d) (mandating that all cus-
tomers pay the same costs for using telecommunications services).
100. Markoski, supra note 32, at 294 n.28. The United Kingdom played a key role
in the establishment of INTELSAT and had a 12.9 percent ownership interest in IN-
TELSAT as of 1985. Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra note 22, at 2.
101. Markoski, supra note 32, at 294 n.28.
102. British Telecommunications Act, 1981, ch. 15, reprinted in 51 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1812-13 (3d ed. 1981).
103. Id. (noting that British Telecom is a Recognized Private Operating Author-
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tition between INTELSAT and British Telecom, however, were still
limited in the United Kingdom as of 1985.1"
A turning point in British telecommunications policy occurred in
1982, when the European Commission found British Telecom guilty
under the European Economic Community Treaty for abusing its domi-
nant position in the British telecommunications industry because it pre-
vented private message-forwarding agencies in the United Kingdom
from relaying telex messages between the United Kingdom and other
countries.10 5 The decision of the Commission protected consumers
against the obsolescence of such services'" and effectively liberalized
telex interconnections in the United Kingdom.107 Application of the
EEC Treaty to the British Telex monopoly threatens similar applica-
tions elsewhere in European Common Market countries.10 8
The United Kingdom is already far advanced in the process of dereg-
ity). See European High Court Antitrust Rulings Presage Telecom Liberalization and
De-regulation, 3 INT'L NETWORKS 1, 3 (Dec. 20, 1985) [hereinafter European Anti-
trust Rulings](discussing the competitive effects of European judicial antitrust rulings
on PTTs).
104. Rein, supra note 53, at 475 n.73. In 1979, the United Kingdom approved the
use of foreign telephones, modems, and other equipment previously obtainable only
through the BPO. Pantages, Telecom Monopoly Weakening, DATANATiON, Oct. 1979,
at 78. As of 1981, some believed that the United Kingdom would adopt open market
policies. Markoski, supra note 32, at 294 n.30. See British Telecommunications Act,
1981, ch. 15, reprinted in 51 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1810 para. 13 (3d
ed. 1981) (granting licenses to competitors if they did not infringe the telecommunica-
tions privileges of British Telecom). British Telecom retained the exclusive privilege of
running the telecommunications systems. Id. at 1809-10 para. 12.
105. British Telecommunications Found Guilty of Abusing Dominant Position
[1982-84 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,433, at 10,979 (1982)
[hereinafter British Telecom Found Guilty]. The Commission held that "Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the Common Market any abuse by one
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market, or in a sub-
stantial part of it, in so far as such abuse may affect trade between Member states."
Id. See also European Antitrust Rulings, supra note 103, at 2 (discussing the EC
ruling).
106. British Telecom Found Guilty, supra note 105. The EC held that when a
Member state with a dominant position takes measures to maintain an obsolete system,
it violates article 86(b) of the (EEC) Treaty of Rome by limiting technical develop-
ment to the ultimate prejudice of its consumers. Id.
107. European Antitrust Rulings, supra note 103, at 1.
108. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 90(2) (providing that undertakings entrusted with the operation
of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing
monopoly are subject to the rules contained in the EEC Treaty).
In 1985, the European Court of Justice upheld the decision of the European Com-
mission against British Telecom in Italy v. Commission. Italian Republic v. Commis-
sion, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,168 (1985). The
Court ruled that government-sanctioned monopoly practices may conflict with the anti-
trust prohibitions of article 86 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
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ulation and liberalization of telecommunications. 09 Some believe that
the United Kingdom is the most likely foreign authority to agree to
FCC separate systems." 0 England has also liberalized the supply of
telecommunications equipment and the provision of value-added
services."'
Large corporate users in the United Kingdom are the primary bene-
ficiaries of new and better services at lower prices resulting from in-
creased competition.' 12 The new services, such as videotext, remote
database access, electronic mail, and data interchange give business
users competitive advantages and alter the nature of business
transactions.'"
109. High Tech Must Bring Deregulation, 63 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COUNCIL, Mar. 1987, at 22 [hereinafter High Tech Must Bring Deregulation].
110. Caplan, supra note 2, at 182. Italy and Portugal may also favor separate sat-
ellite systems. Id. The United Kingdom and the United States have commenced their
first transatlantic exchange of high-speed digital channels through earth stations that
their respective INTELSAT signatories do not directly own. Colino before Parliamen-
tary Committee, supra note 22, at 2. International Relay, Inc. of the United States and
Cable and Wireless' Mercury Communications of Great Britain are establishing direct
communication links between New York and London. Id. Richard Colino has described
this activity as a seemingly competitive trend that is consistent with the INTELSAT
Agreement. Id.
11. Pattie Address, supra note 1, at 3. Mercury Communications, a subsidiary of
Cable & Wireless, is competing with British Telecom in England's new era of open
market communications, offering the first alternative telephone service in the United
Kingdom. Mercury Competing Worldwide, 62 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COUNCIL, Oct. 1986, at 35.
Mercury first offered its cheaper, superior quality service to business users, and then
expanded service to residential customers as of 1986. Id. Customer savings on selected
international routes are expected to average up to 24 per cent. Id.
Mercury, now an established international carrier, contracted with AT&T to operate
a British-American international switched telephone service. Id. Mercury has joined
British Telecom in providing a wholly digital network. Pattie Address, supra note I, at
5. Similar to its agreement with AT&T, Mercury has entered into a contract with ITT
World Communications and others to provide private leased circuits via satellite for
transatlantic voice and data communications. Id. Mercury also offers a transatlantic
electronic mail system allowing United Kingdom customers to communicate with over
150,000 American correspondents. Id.
Britain now offers its first satellite system, UNISAT, launched in 1986. SENIOR IN-
TERAGENCY GROUP, supra note 4, at 25. UNISAT provides domestic television trans-
mission and certain international commercial services through a beam that covers the
United States eastern seaboard and most of Western Europe. Id.
112. Pattie Address, supra note 1, at 4-5. The new integrated digital exchanges of
British Telecom can connect voice and data to users at the same time or can switch
from one to the other midway through a phone call. Id. The new exchange systems can
connect users in the major United Kingdom business centers with advanced network
services, including text, fast facsimile, picture videotext, graphics and slow-scan televi-
sion. Id. Moreover, British Telecom has expanded its high speed international satellite
links. Id.
113. Id. at 6. The United Kingdom has more than 200 value-added network service
(VANS) providers offering more than 800 different services, which expands the total
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The United Kingdom has advanced substantially in implementing
competition in telecommunications during the 1980S.114 Internationally,
the United Kingdom has liberalized its end of all international circuits
with a new value added and data services license. 1 Thus, the United
Kingdom service providers can offer any value-added or data service
over lines leased internationally.11 6 The benefits to consumers of the
changes in Britain are great because competition forces telecommuni-
cations suppliers to meet market demands more effectively.1 27 Whereas
in previous years the development of services was always supply-led, it
is now demand-led in Great Britain.1 18
2. New Trends in Europe
The European PTT administrations are still monopoly oriented, but
sole allegiance to the PTT administrations in their own countries is
softening. 9 The countries of the European Community are under
great pressure to deregulate.1 20 The introduction of competition in
Great Britain has increased demands for competition in international
services throughout the rest of Western Europe, at first spawning price
competition, then spreading to require increased service differentia-
tion. 121 The dominant position of the PTTs is slowly eroding as the
United Kingdom VANS market to an estimated £100-£200 million and promises to
make the United Kingdom VANS market one of the future world leaders. Id. at 5. By
improving global data communication and sophisticated electronic trading, VANS have
advanced London's role in world financial markets. Id. at 6. Through VANS, a sender
can deliver messages from computer to computer through the telephone network. New
Lines for Old, ECoNOMIST, Oct. 23, 1987, at 5 [hereinafter New Lines for Old].
114. Pattie Address, supra note 1, at 2-3. The United Kingdom approach has be-
come "the vanguard of change, from the old monopolistic approach to one which is
unashamedly one of liberalization and increased competition." Id.
115. Id. at 6-7.
116. Id. These services are subject to bilateral agreements with other countries. Id.
Current bilateral discussions center on the establishment of these services between the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2.
119. High Tech Must Bring Deregulation, supra note 109, at 22. See also Euro-
pean Antitrust Rulings, supra note 103, at 7 (noting that ruling political parties rang-
ing from West German, Dutch, and Belgian conservatives to French and Italian social-
ists have adopted policies for the liberalization of telecommunications).
120. France Goes Ahead in Europe's Telecoms, 62 Ir'L PRESS TELECOMnMUNICA-
TIONS COUNCIL, Oct. 1986, at 44 [hereinafter France Goes Ahead in Europe's
Telecoms]. For example, before the United Kingdom deregulated, regulations handi-
capped British firms and prevented them from obtaining such services that would en-
able computers to dial telephone numbers by themselves, and other features considered
standard elsewhere. Id.
121. Coustel, Telecommunications Services in France, 10 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PoL'y 229, 234 (Sept. 1986). See European Antitrust Rulings, supra note 103, at 136
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need for privatization and competition gain recognition.122 Telecommu-
nications providers around the world are similarly realizing the pres-
sures for liberalization.123
(stating that the need for hard cash from private industry to modernize adds impetus to
the pressure for liberalizing policies).
122. See Dutch PTT Goes Private, 63 INT'L PREss TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUN-
CIL, Mar. 1987, at 19 (noting that the Netherlands announced the privatization of the
Dutch PTT, to the Tariffs and Facilities Committee in October of 1986 partially in
response to anti-monopoly legislation of the EEC).
The privatization announcement of the Netherlands caused alarm in the Deutsche
Bundespost, the German PTT. Id. Even though the Bundespost, remains publicly
owned, it also faces the possibility of privatization. Id. In response to this challenge,
twenty thousand members of the German Postal Union held a protest meeting in Co-
logne against alleged government plans to sell profitable parts of Germany's telecom-
munications and telephone authority to private business. Id. Following the decision of
the European Court of Justice in Italy v. Commission, the Bundespost withdrew regu-
lations that would have extended its monopoly to cordless telephones. The Bundespost
had previously relinquished its express mail monopoly after an earlier EEC proceeding.
European Antitrust Rulings, supra note 103, at I.
The dominant position of the Bundespost is potentially open to a challenge by the
European Commission as a result of an experiment it undertook in October 1986. Test
Could Mean Roof Dishes For Germany, 63 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COUNCIL, Mar. 1987, at 21. The experiment sought to attract custom satellite commu-
nications that could lead to the establishment of 400 or 500 receive-only earth stations
in Germany. Id. The conservative position of the Bundespost, which seeks to retain
total control over the provision of satellite services and ground terminals, has thwarted
the potential success of the experiment. Id. Consequently, should the Bundespost se-
verely obstruct these new services, it could result in an adverse European Commission
decision, finding the maintenance of obsolete services to the detriment of customers to
be an abuse of the Bundespost's dominant position.
In France, the Direction Generale des Telecommunications (DGT) is the only au-
thorized provider of public telecommunications services, apart from Telediffusion de
France (TDF). Coustel, supra note 121, at 233. The PTT of France has harmonized
the policies of DGT and TDF. Id.
Although France is unlikely to privatize its PTT, the Minister of Posts and Telecom-
munication will probably impose deregulation of advanced value-added services, video
texts, and private business networks. France Goes Ahead in Europe's Telecoms, supra
note 120, at 44. The reduction of the monopoly of the DGT is likely to transform DGT
into a state service. Id. The Ministry of Industry would then assume DGT's responsibil-
ity for the telecommunications and electronics industry. Id.
France has already opened certain segments of the telecommunications market to
competition including the installation of customer premises and terminal related equip-
ment, such as answering devices, modems, sophisticated telephone terminals, and telex
terminals. Coustel, supra note 121, at 233. Newly opened markets relate to business
communication needs, including local networks, and private automatic branch ex-
changes linked to the public network. Id.
The French Company Compagnie General d'Electricite, merged with the European
and worldwide branches of International Telephone & Telegraph to form the second
largest equipment business in the world after AT&T. France Goes Ahead in Europe's
Telecoms, supra note 120, at 44. Mergers like this one will allow Europe to compete
more effectively against Japan and the United States for the revolutionizing telecom-
munications market. Id.
123. See Malaysia Moves to Privatization, 14 COMMUNICATIONS INT'L, Feb. 1987,
at 4 (noting that Syarikat Telekom Malaysia (STM), a private limited company, will
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Europe has begun to undergo the process of modernizing its telecom-
munications." The European Commission prepared a "Green Pa-
per"'25 on the implementation of a Common Market for telecommuni-
cations. 126 The primary goals of the Green Paper are to work toward a
European-wide market for value-added services and terminals, and to
maintain and strengthen the future telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.117 The Green Paper expresses the need for the European Commu-
subsume national communications previously provided by Jabatan Telekom Malaysia,
a state organization); Markoski, supra note 32, at 294 n.30 (noting that Canada has
attempted to promote competition in the telecommunications industry and has author-
ized the joinder of the Canadian National/Canadian Pacific network to Bell's Cana-
dian network); Projects Multiply as Freedom Boosts Japan's Telecoms, 62 INT'L
PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, Oct. 1986, at 8 (noting that Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT), the Japanese telecommunications carrier,
became the largest stock holding company in Japan). The Japanese international car-
rier, Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co. Ltd., is already private. Markoski, supra note 32, at
294 n.29. Foreign companies are also making some inroads to Japan. Id. For example,
International Business Machines is involved in a joint venture with NTT to provide a
data-communications network over NTT lines. Id.
124. High Tech Must Bring Deregulation, supra note 109, at 22 (explaining that
considerable European investments in digital telecommunications technology are rap-
idly changing the analog infrastructure and improving the efficiency and quality of
existing services, while supporting the provision of new services). The PTTs seek expan-
sion through increasing digitization of the telecommunications infrastructure, network
integration, and new services such as cellular radio, videotext, Integrated Services Digi-
tal Networks (ISDN-a new public switched telephone standard), broadband communi-
cations, private-voice and non-voice networking. Id. By 1990, EUTELSAT and IN-
TELSAT satellites will carry approximately 55 channels suitable for European
television distribution. Id. Societe Europeene des Satellites Astra of Luxembourg,
Telecom I of France, and Kopermikus of West Germany, along with a number of
broadcast satellites, will provide additional television capacity. Id. Moreover, the EC
countries have agreed to a process of "homologation," that is, equipment approved for
the network in one country can be used in other EC countries. New Lines for Old,
supra note 113, at 25.
125. Green Paper on Europe, 63 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL,
Mar. 1987, at 13 [hereinafter Green Paper]. The Green Paper follows the guidance of
article 2 of the Treaty of Rome and recommends the implementation of the future
provision of community-wide services and European-wide connectivity. Id.
126. Id. See also New Lines for Old, supra note 113, at 27 (stating that European
countries reached an agreement in May 1987 to set a European standard for digital
mobile communications). This standard will improve the competitive stance of Euro-
pean manufacturers and at the same time increase their market share. Id.
127. Green Paper, supra note 125, at 13. One purpose of European harmonization
of telecommunications is to develop a solid domestic market base from which to com-
pete with American and Japanese suppliers in world markets. High Tech Must Bring
Deregulation, supra note 109, at 22. In 1986, the twelve member EC endorsed the
coordination of ISDN services across the entire continent commencing in 1988. Belit-
sos, ISDN: Oceans Apart, 3 NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 4, 1986, at 33 [hereinafter
ISDN: Oceans Apart]. In another proposal, the European Commission established
RACE (Research and Development in Advanced Communications technologies for Eu-
rope) to implement by the 1990s, a reference model for a standardized European public
wideband, or "Eurogrid." A Radical Proposal for Telecom Infrastructure from the
EC, 3 INT'L NETWORKS, Nov. 1, 1985, at 1. Full implementation of "Eurogrid" will
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nity to develop a new framework that will accommodate evolution but
that will preserve the major achievements of the past, such as the coop-
eration and international coordination of INTELSAT along the major
traffic routes.12 8 The Green Paper also stresses safeguarding the role of
the telecommunications administrations in Europe in implementing
more European-wide connectivity. 1 9
In recent years, governments have recognized the importance of
maximizing growth in their telecommunications, computer, informa-
tion, and aerospace industries. 30 For example, PTTs in industrializing
and developing countries are buying the most sophisticated switching
technology available.' 3' Nearly half the orders for the newest equip-
ment will come from East Asia.132 In Europe, the European Commu-
nity has recently encouraged the relaxation of government procurement
policies to promote the Community as the leading supplier of global
telecommunications needs.1
33
require a total replacement of existing analog and the proposed PTT ISDN telecommu-
nications plants. Id.
The harmonization of European telecommunications, however, must overcome several
obstacles including widely differing objectives of the PTTs' plans and policies relative
to tariffs, equipment purchases, and technical specifications. High Tech Must Bring
Deregulation, supra note 109, at 22.
128. Green Paper, supra note 125, at 13. Recognition of the disadvantages of the
fragmented United States telecommunications infrastructure reinforces European ap-
preciation for the importance of coordination of the telecommunications revolution. See
ISDN: Oceans Apart, supra note 127, at 1, 36 (noting that the lack of a centralized
planning authority is causing difficulty in developing a conversion to ISDN).
129. Green Paper, supra note 125, at 13.
130. See Hayes, South Korea Develops Telecoms Equipment Production, 14 CoM-
MUNICATIONS INT., Feb. 1987, at 18 (commenting that South Korea is beginning to
export telecommunications equipment). Daewoo Telecom Company obtained a Phil-
lipine contract worth $24 million to install digital exchange switching equipment capa-
ble of handling 40,000 phone lines. Id.
131. Explosive Switching Growth for Developing Countries, 14 COMMUNICATIONS
INT'L, Feb. 1987, at 4. Although switching purchases only increased from $1.4 billion
in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1986, purchases in 1987 rose sharply to $1.9 billion and are
expected to jump to $2.7 billion by 1990. Id. Pyramid Research of Massachusetts
predicts that developing and industrializing countries will grow as much as 24 percent
per year in the digital public switching area through the 1990s. Id.
132. Id. Countries like Singapore and South Korea are planning future conversion
of their telephone networks to ISDN. ISDN: Oceans Apart, supra note 127, at 33. In
Japan, the regulated quasi-monopoly, NT&T is promoting a similar ISDN network.
id. at 36.
133. Markoski, supra note 32, at 294 n.30. The European foresight of the world's
explosive need for communication satellites inspired the establishment of European
Ariane rockets to compete with NASA. Colino before Parliamentary Committee, supra
note 32, at 6. The Ariane rockets will launch French, West German, and Scandinavian
DBS satellites that use high power transponders to beam television signals to small
domestic antennas. Glut of Transponder Capacity, 63 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS COUNCIL. Mar. 1987, at 22.
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While the United States and Great Britain are favoring the estab-
lishment of market forces in international satellite telecommunications,
Japan and France are also introducing limited competition to their own
domestic markets. The European Commission has begun to enforce an-
titrust clauses of the European Community Treaty. Jacques Dondoux,
Director General of Telecommunications in the French PTT Ministry
expressed concerns regarding the need for healthy competition and the
opening up of European markets together with the need for greater
cooperation to deter uncontrolled international deregulation. 13
VII. LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PRESSURES TO
LIMIT PRICE FLEXIBILITY
A. POTENTIAL HARM TO Low DENSITY AREAS
INTELSAT seeks to achieve a global system which will expand ser-
vices to all areas of the world and will contribute to world peace and
understanding. 38 While a price flexibility amendment must foster max-
imum growth in the developed world to avoid harm to the PTTs, the
amendment must also continue to serve the needs of LDCs.
Open market benefits of separate systems would favor high density
countries such as the United States. Low density countries, however,
would not reap the benefits of increased competition because competi-
tor systems would seek markets only in high density routes. 130 Separate
satellite systems providing routes between the high density users would
divert the most important source of revenue for INTELSAT, increase
the costs of INTELSAT space segment utilization, 37 and harm low
density users disproportionately.113 Yet, LDCs would incur harmful re-
134. Address by Jacques Dondoux, Financial Times Conference of World Telecom-
munications, reprinted in 61 INT'L PREss TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, Mar. 1986,
at 6.
135. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 9, at preamble.
136. See New Lines for Old, supra note 113, at 20 (noting that new entrants will
compete for the most lucrative markets without an obligation to serve unprofitable sec-
tors); see also Rein, supra note 53, at 481 (noting that separate systems will probably
not offer services to low density areas due to the small profit opportunities that exist).
Moreover, the PTT monopolies of the underdeveloped countries have not yet "marke-
tized" large sectors of their countries. Snow, supra note 33, at 286.
137. See Rein, supra note 53, at 481 n.102 (noting that as high density revenues
are lost to competitors, the cost of utilizing the INTELSAT network (IUCs) will
spread to the remaining high and low-density customers).
138. W. Hinchman Assoc., International Satellite Competition Impact Analysis/
scenario 4, FCC Docket No. 84-1299 (January 25, 1985). Analysts predicted in 1985
that if the proposed separate systems designed to provide service between the United
States and Europe were implemented, INTELSAT would lose all United States-Euro-
pean voice circuits protected for use as record, data, or AVD circuits, thereby forcing
significant increases in INTELSAT's annual costs per utilized transponder. W. Hinch-
1988]
412 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 3:383
sults should the proposed amendment give INTELSAT complete pric-
ing discretion.139 Unfettered INTELSAT price flexibility would cause
great economic harm to underdeveloped countries and force them to
either reduce or terminate their participation in INTELSAT.1
4 0
man Associates, The Economics of International Satellite Communications, Summary
Report, at 14, May 18, 1984 (FCC Docket No. 84-1299) [hereinafter Economics of
International Satellite].
Because INTELSAT signatories are reimbursed on a pro rata basis on return from
INTELSAT's revenues, failure to meet anticipated demand harms the signatories
where traffic is lightest. Sarreals, supra note 5, at 229. For example, in the African
region, 31 countries are members of INTELSAT and 50 countries use the INTELSAT
network for the provision of international service. SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP, supra
note 4, at 4. Many of these African countries use INTELSAT as the sole provider of
domestic service. Id. The African member nations hold a 6.58 percent ownership in-
vestment interest in INTELSAT. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 3 1, at 5.
As a result, African nations would either bear a disproportionate percentage of the
total cost increases or would be forced to withdraw from INTELSAT. Id. Even though
African nations would carry an average of 1.83 times more of the cost burden than
non-African nations, the increase to the sixteen smallest African INTELSAT members
would result in a 3.26 times higher cost burden. Id.
This disproportionate burden on the smallest INTELSAT members results because
article V(b) of the INTELSAT Agreement requires signatories to maintain a minimum
investment share of 0.05%, even if they do not use INTELSAT service. INTELSAT
Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(b). The sixteen smallest African INTELSAT mem-
bers must maintain this minimum share which in 1984, required an annual investment
of $800,000. Comments of Transafrica, supra note 67, at 9.
139. See Comments of AT&T supra note 43, at 34 (conceding that de-averaging
may cause prices in the low traffic routes to rise); Hinchman Comments, supra note 39,
at 16 (stating that although INTELSAT would remain a formidable competitor should
it become a strictly commercial enterprise, "thin routes" would still experience large
cost increases due to INTELSAT's large economies of scale); see also Reply Com-
ments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that complete price flexibility, like
the introduction of separate satellite systems, has the same adverse economic impact on
the less developed countries). Low density countries have expressed concerns relating to
the conversion of INTELSAT from a cost-sharing cooperative to a purely commercial
enterprise. Id. To allay these fears, Colino has reassured LDCs that INTELSAT will
remain a non-profit cooperative. Global Salesmanship, supra note 10, at 36.
140. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 7 n.12. In the poorest na-
tions, the demand for international telecommunications is highly price elastic. Letter of
the East-West Institute of Culture and Communication to Secretary of the FCC,
(Docket No. 84-1299) (Feb. 11, 1985), [hereinafter East-West letter]. As utilization
costs increase, the demand for services decreases at a greater than proportional rate.
Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 1. Increases in INTELSAT costs
will probably postpone the investment of less developed countries in new international
telecommunications facilities. Id. at 2. Reasons for high price elasticity in Africa in-
clude limited resources and budgets, lack of borrowing power found in developed and
industrializing nations, low levels of disposable income of governments, businesses and
consumers, and the high priority placed on the expansion of domestic services. Id. at 2,
9-10, 13.
Unlike developed countries which can turn to cables as a substitute for satellites, low
density countries depend more heavily on satellites and cannot easily turn to undersea
or land cables. Id. at 14.
The Sub-Saharan African telecommunications sector is the weakest in the world.
Guttman, supra note 38, at 333. The Sub-Saharan region contains more than 8 percent
INTELSAT PRICE FLEXIBILITY
Telecommunications is vital for the structure and competitiveness of
many businesses, and for the smooth flow of international commerce
and trade. 41 An efficient and commercially viable telecommunications
system also stimulates greater participation of international organiza-
tions and financial institutions in addressing the problems unique to
LDCs.1
4 2
The increased costs of communications and diminished reliability of
telephone service will serve to dissuade multinational corporations
(MNCs) from investing in the poorest of countries. The MNCs will
rechannel investment from LDCs to more developed and industrializing
countries where communications and related services are available in a
wider variety and better quality. 43 At the Ninth Meeting of the IN-
TELSAT Assembly of Parties in January 1985, Zambia's representa-
tive referred to any discussion of shifting costs to developing nations as
an "unwelcome burden for these nations which are already going
through crippling economic difficulties."
144
In addition to harming the poorest nations, complete pricing flexibil-
ity or frequent traffic diversion would also severely harm the economies
of the world's population and less than 0.5 percent of the world's telephone lines. Id. at
326. Less than two of every thousand people have direct access to those lines. Id. Nige-
ria, the largest African INTELSAT investor, in 1981 had a population of seventy mil-
lion served by only 175,000 telephones. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31,
at 12. The high costs of domestic telephone service are due largely to the scarcity of
traffic. Id. at 11-13. With few exceptions, a telecommunications exchange consists of a
single local switch with under 5,000 lines. Id. Another reason for scarcity in traffic is
the wide distances between the communication points served. Id. Broad global antenna
beams are needed to reach a large portion of the African continent, while more cost
effective spot beams prove useless. Id.
The highest priority of PITs in African states is the extension of services to rural
areas. Id. at 10-13. More than 80 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans live outside the
major urban centers with access to only about 12 percent of the telephones. Guttman,
supra note 38, at 332. For example, in the Ivory Coast, 90 percent of the country's
telephones were in the city of Abidjan. Id. The Ivory Coast five year plan called for a
threefold increase in the number of phones with the highest priority being the extension
of service to the rural areas. Id.
Only seven of 42 African countries have access to Atlantic and Indian Ocean satel-
lites of INTELSAT. Guttman, supra note 38, at 332. Thus calls to a majority of the
globe require multiple hops, reducing transmission quality, ease of connection and in-
creasing the costs. Id.
141. Pattie Address, supra note 1, at 2.
142. See Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 14 n.18 (noting that
international satellite communications are essential to efforts similar to the provision of
emergency food and medical aid to the famine victims of East Africa). The breakdown
of a circuit results in long delays in the shipment and distribution of supplies to partic-
ular settlements and communities. Id.
143. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 8. The LDCs could at-
tempt to offset their diminished attractiveness to foreign investors, however, through
the offer of better trade incentives and privileges. Id.
144. Id. at 7 n.12.
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of the Pacific Island Nations (PINs).'" Most obviously, any significant
loss of Atlantic Ocean revenue would pressure INTELSAT to increase
the costs for its Pacific Ocean users.'4 Such action would have disas-
trous consequences on the growth of commerce and Pacific markets for
American exports.147 Although the Pacific Ocean is rapidly becoming a
higher density and thus a more desirable telecommunications mar-
ket, 14  PINs continue to experience problems in telecommunications
efficiency.1
49
Telecommunications is a fundamental element in economic develop-
ment.'50 For example, one study concluded that development of tele-
phone systems in the poorer rural regions of the United States in-
creased the local gross national product of these areas between six and
seven times greater than the cost of their implementation.'
Developed countries have a great interest in the economic well-being
of LDCs because the world has become increasingly economically in-
terdependent." 2 A price flexibility amendment tailored to prevent al-
145. East-West letter, supra note 140. Due to the limited economic development,
small size, and vast geographic distances of the Pacific Island Nations, no plans exist
for laying submarine cables. Comments of Hawaiian Telephone Co. at 2, In the Matter
of Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, FCC
Docket No. 84-1299 (Apr. 1, 1985). Other types of transmission such as high fre-
quency radio are unreliable. Moreover, many such islands have fragile economies and
experience difficulty obtaining the necessary financial resources to develop their tele-
communications infrastructures. Id. at 2-3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pacific: The Ocean of the Future, 61 INT'L PRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COUNCIL, Mar. 1986, at 8. Deputy Director General of INTELSAT, David Tudge,
informed the Pacific Basin Information Industry Trade Mission and Conference that
the Pacific Ocean Region not only expanded its lead over the Atlantic in annual volume
of international trade by $30 billion in 1985, but also expanded its use of INTELSAT,
growing at an annual rate of 20%, which is far greater than any ocean region. Id.
149. East-West letter, supra note 140. PINs, less developed in economic terms,
must also overcome the geographical obstacles of large clusters of numerous islands
rendering undersea cable communications cost prohibitive. Id. PINs depend highly on
INTELSAT to make their communications routes more efficient. Id.
150. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 14 n.18 (citing Report of
the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development: The
Missing Link, Sir Donald Maitland, Chairman (ITU, January, 1985)). Sir Maitland
established the Maitland Commission to develop a worldwide strategy for the develop-
ment of telecommunications in the Third World. Id.
151. Jequier, supra note 2, at 84. See also Chu, Rural Telephone in Indonesia and
Thailand, 9 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 159, 163-64 (June 1985) (noting that the
development of a telephone system in rural areas has had positive social effects, includ-
ing greater worker productivity).
152. Colino, Global Politics and INTELSAT, 10 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y
195, 204-05 (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter Politics and INTELSAT]. This interdependence
manifests itself in such tensions as access to world mineral resources, the impact of the
developed world on the oil and mineral policies of the less developed nations, and the
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ternate routing of high density traffic and resulting revenue loss to IN-
TELSAT, while, at the same time, maintaining subsidies to LDCs is in
the best interest of all users. 53
B. INTERSPUTNIK AND THE THIRD WORLD ALTERNATIVE
INTELSAT is considered one of the great achievements of Ameri-
can foreign policy.15 The Kennedy Administration desired the estab-
lishment of a global communications satellite network as an attempt to
compete with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the emerging na-
tions. The perception of the United States abandoning INTELSAT by
allowing a multitude of private systems to flourish and perform all IN-
TELSAT functions would harm United States diplomatic interests and
credibility in LDCs.155 Diminished international access through IN-
TELSAT and apprehension of United States abandonment of its long-
standing commitment to provide international telecommunications ser-
vices could persuade less developed countries to turn to the Soviet IN-
TERSPUTNIK system for the provision of services. 156
INTERSPUTNIK is a rival global system which the Soviet Union
uses to supplant INTELSAT in some countries.157 Until now, few
countries have shown an interest in INTERSPUTNIK which is largely
impact of inflationary and disinflationary policies of developed nations on each as well
as on the newly industrializing world. Id.
153. Id. at 206.
154. Colino before Federal Communications Bar, supra note 9, at 3. Former Chair-
man of the FCC, Abbott Washburn, referred to INTELSAT as comparable to the
Marshall Plan, representing perhaps the greatest sharing of high technology known to
man. Id.
155. Reply Comments of Transafrica, supra note 31, at 4.
156. Id. at 18; see Statement of Joel R. Alper, President of the World Systems
Division of COMSAT before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunication and Fi-
nance on Energy and Commerce (July 26, 1984) (FCC Docket No. 84-1299) [herein-
after Alper Statement] (warning that a weakened INTELSAT and greater burdens on
developing nations would make them more vulnerable to solicitations from the Soviets).
157. Id. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union announced plans for a seven satellite
INTERSPUTNIK network. Only two were in operation in 1984. Shinn & Swensrod,
INTERSPUTNIK: Current Status and Future Options, Georgetown University Center
for Strategic and International Studies 1 (1984) (available at FCC Docket No. 84-
1299) [hereinafter Shinn & Swensrod]. INTERSPUTNIK began its operations in
1971 with nine charter members: the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bul-
garia, Rumania, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, and Mongolia. Id.
INTERSPUTNIK leased transponders on three generations of elliptical-orbit
Molniya satellites. Id. By 1979, INTERSPUTNIK began using four transponders of
120 circuits each on geosynchronous Gorizont satellites. Id. The Soviet Union has de-
veloped increasing technical and operational capabilities. Id. The Soviet deployment of
a space shuttle and an operation Saturn V-class rocket enhance their communications
capabilities. Id. This advanced technology increases their ability to place large payloads
economically into geostationary orbit. Id. at 12.
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limited to transmissions among Soviet client states. 158 Recent develop-
ments indicate, however, that the Soviet Union is preparing to take full
advantage of diversification of the international satellite networks to
increase its customer base. 159 Increased LDC usage of INTER-
SPUTNIK may effectively further the foreign policy interests of the
Soviet Union. 160
INTERSPUTNIK is a highly subsidized and therefore cheaper, al-
ternative to INTELSAT.' INTELSAT, however, still offers many ad-
vantages over INTERSPUTNIK. 62 Soviet satellite communications
158. Politics and INTELSAT, supra note 152, at 206. Since 1971, five countries
have subsequently joined INTERSPUTNIK including Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan,
North Korea, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Shinn & Swensrod,
supra note 157, at 2. In addition, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq use the network for commu-
nications with Moscow. Id. By 1984, earth stations were under construction in Angola
and Libya. Id. at 3. In the Western Hemisphere, Nicaragua has an earth station, and
the United States discovered an earth station under construction in Grenada during the
United States invasion there in 1983. Id. at 2. Since 1980, INTERSPUTNIK has
sought the additional membership of Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Syria, Alge-
ria, Madagascar, and Brazil. Id. at 3.
159. Shinn & Swensrod, supra note 157, at 3. At the International Telecommuni-
cations Union, the Cubans have taken steps to obtain a spot over the Caribbean for
INTERSPUTNIK. Id. at 11. The Cubans have indicated that they might use such a
satellite to build a regional network. Id.
Soviet satellite communications developments improve its Intervision network by pro-
viding live or newsfilm transmissions from Moscow at one-third the rates of INTEL-
SAT; appealing to the LDC television market with one-way transmissions of sporting
events, documentaries and academic courses to universities; and expanding interna-
tional video conferencing. Id. at 7. INTERSPUTNIK may also attempt to establish
point-to-point domestic communications links in LDCs-for television, radio, facsimile,
and telephone transmissions. Id. at 11.
160. Politics and INTELSAT, supra note 152, at 206. INTERSPUTNIK is cur-
rently the major vehicle for Soviet agitational and propaganda activities. Id. For exam-
ple, INTERSPUTNIK carried free coverage of the Friendship Games in Moscow to its
subscribers. Id. See also Shinn & Swensrod, supra note 157, at 4 (arguing that a
larger INTERSPUTNIK system, coupled with the Soviet development of spot beams,
could enable the establishment of secure and direct links to any member nation trans-
mitting sensitive military communications in the event of a Soviet military undertak-
ing). Conversely, the United States Department of Defense depends heavily upon IN-
TELSAT as its principal or sole link to many LDCs. Alper Statement, supra note 156,
at 12.
161. Shinn & Swensrod, supra note 157, at 3. In 1982, for example, INTER-
SPUTNIK charged $11,615 for the lease of one voice circuit for one year, compared to
INTELSAT, which charged $19,358. Id. Earth station operations for a video channel
cost $383 for the first ten minutes and $11 for each additional minute on INTER-
SPUTNIK, compared to $968 and $30 respectively, on INTELSAT. Id. As earth sta-
tions become smaller and cheaper, the Soviet Union may exploit the opportunities to
donate them or supply them at subsidized costs. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 4. INTELSAT's preemption in the international communications net-
work has been the primary reason for foregoing INTERSPUTNIK. Id. Even the Soviet
Union must resort to INTELSAT when it needs to communicate outside the limited
INTERSPUTNIK network. Id. at 4. Moreover, whereas INTELSAT allows freedom
in communications and encompasses many ideologies and varieties of political systems,
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technologies still remain behind those of INTELSAT, but not so far
behind that INTERSPUTNIK cannot exploit LDC dissatisfaction with
INTELSAT and take advantage of opportunities for expansion.
CONCLUSION
Separate international communications systems currently face high
barriers in entering the international satellite communications field. If
the expanding demand for services is not met, however, or not met at a
fair price, separate systems may soon become a reality. The amend-
ment of article V(d) of INTELSAT is essential to stay this threat. The
amendment must carefully redefine the pricing flexibilities of INTEL-
SAT to enable LDCs to develop optimally.
The most effective modification to article V(d) would include the op-
erational distinctions outlined in the FCC Report and Order. These op-
erational distinctions would make INTELSAT competitive in the lim-
ited area open to separate systems, thus meeting the most dynamic
marketplace needs while preserving the price subsidization provisions.
Some measure of price averaging is necessary to maintain some degree
of subsidization for low density countries. Such pricing flexibility fos-
ters optimal economic growth in both LDCs as well as developed
countries.
This rise in competition among domestic and international telecom-
munications systems ends the era of a single system assuming privileges
and taking for granted its domination of markets. Increased competi-
tion encourages suppliers to develop a sense of market needs and re-
wards those who seize the initiative. A continuation of a monopolistic
attitude inflates the price of state-of-the-art telecommunications, damp-
ens demand and encourages the initiative for prospective competitors to
enter the telecommunications market. An amendment to the INTEL-
SAT Agreement providing for a tailored degree of pricing flexibility
would eliminate private invasion of those areas most detrimental to the
developing nations while ensuring the prominence in the market of in-
ternational communications thus fostering optimal telecommunications
and economic development throughout the world.
the Soviet Union strictly controls information from the outside. Id.
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